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INTRODUCTION
Observers spanning the political spectrum heralded the passage
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA")' as a cure for the
widespread sentencing disparities existing throughout the federal
criminal justice system due to the virtually unfettered discretion of
sentencing judges. Rather than vest sentencing discretion in one
governmental body, the SRA divided the responsibilities among three
entities, granting to each duties suited to its institutional role in
government. Congress, in its broad policymaking capacity, would
issue general directives to the Sentencing Commission
("Commission"), an agency situated within the judicial branch.2 The
judiciary, the body with wisdom accumulated through decades of
hands-on experience with sentencing, would comprise a majority of
the Commission. The Commission, a panel of specialized experts,
would then produce a comprehensive set of guidelines designed to
promote uniformity and proportionality in sentencing across the
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (2000)).
2. The U.S. Sentencing Commission, created by the SRA, is an independent agency
within the judicial branch. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2000). The Supreme Court settled the
constitutionality of this delegation in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
The duty of the Commission is to draft sentencing standards in order to ensure uniformity
in sentencing for all federal criminal prosecutions, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2000),
and to periodically revise those standards in order to better achieve the purposes of the
SRA. Id. at § 994(o).
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criminal justice system-the United States Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines").
In addition, district court judges were to play a crucial role in
assisting the Commission to fine-tune the Guidelines through a so-
called "departure" mechanism.3 Congress and the Commission,
aware that they lacked the case-by-case perspective of the trial bench,
understood that the Commission would be unable to account for
every factor relevant to achieving the SRA's goals of proportionality
and uniformity in each individual case. Accordingly, trial judges were
given the power to depart from the Guidelines when the "court finds
that an aggravating or mitigating circumstance exists that was not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines and that should result in a sentence
different from that described."4
The division of labor between Congress, the Commission, and
the Judiciary was the delicate balance of power struck by the SRA
after years of debate in Congress. The SRA gave each entity
responsibilities corresponding to its own unique perspectives,
strengths, and expertise. Many of the failures attributed to the
federal sentencing system since the enactment of the SRA can be
traced to some action, by one participant or another, that disrupted
the SRA's balance of powers. Some complain that the Commission
took an unjustifiably narrow view of the trial courts' ability to depart
from the Guidelines.5 Others point to congressional usurpation,
through its enactment of mandatory minimum statutes, of the
Commission's duty to design sentencing ranges for particular crimes.6
3. Generally speaking, the offense of conviction and other relevant factors determine
a narrow range of punishment to which the court must sentence an offender. As will be
explained in more detail below, the Guidelines permit the sentencing judge to "depart"
from the Guidelines and sentence an offender to a punishment outside the prescribed
range in unusual circumstances. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5k2.0 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 U.S.S.G.]. For examples of departures, see
infra note 63 and accompanying text.
4. Pub. L. 98-473, § 212(b), 98 Stat. 1987, (1990) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(b)(1) (West Supp. 2004)).
5. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a
Jurisprudence That Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 21, 48-49 (2000) (arguing that the Commission took a narrow and restrictive
approach to departures); Marc Miller, Guidelines Are Not Enough: The Need For Written
Sentencing Opinions, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 3, 11 (1989) (noting the reformers' assumption
that the vast majority of cases would fall within the prescribed range).
6. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for this Age of Federal Sentencing:
The Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 99-100
(2000) (criticizing mandatory minimum statutes and noting that they signal congressional
distrust of the Commission); Norval Morris, Towards Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L.
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The most recent, perhaps the most drastic, and certainly the most
blatantly intentional example of such disruption is the Feeney
Amendment to the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End
the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act,7  an
amendment tacked onto a politically popular bill after mere hours of
debate.'
The objective of the Amendment is to reduce the role of the
judiciary in formulating sentencing policy, in large part through
further curtailing judicial discretion at sentencing. 9  Though the
Amendment achieves this goal primarily by diminishing judicial
discretion to depart from the Guidelines range at sentencing, the
Amendment's provisions viewed as a whole evidence a distrust of the
federal trial bench. While the SRA viewed the judiciary as a
cooperating participant in the evolution of federal sentencing law, the
Feeney Amendment regards the trial bench as an enemy who must be
carefully monitored to ensure compliance with the Guidelines. 10
Among other things, the Feeney Amendment requires district
judges to provide written justifications for any departure from the
Guidelines;" holds the chief judge in each district individually
accountable for compiling a voluminous report on each criminal case
tried in the district; 2 orders the Commission "to ensure that the
REV. 267, 279 (1977) (severely criticizing mandatory minimum statutes generally);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem is
Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 848 (1992) (noting that mandatory
minimum statutes "result in arbitrarily harsh sentences disproportionate to culpability").
7. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
and 28 U.S.C.).
8. The Feeney Amendment, presented by Rep. Tom Feeney of Florida, was added to
S. 151, the PROTECT ACT, as section 109 of the engrossed House Amendment to S. 151.
See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 108-66, at 58 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.A.A.N. 683, 693;
see also Amendment included in Final Version of Bill posted on Rep. Feeney's House
website, at http://www.house.gov/feeney/downloads/feeneyamd/confrpt.pdf (last visited
Jan. 24, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). On absence of discussion
and debate, see 149 CONG. REC. S5120 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
9. See Part II.
10. Senator Kennedy maintains that certain provisions of the Feeney Amendment are
clearly intended to create a "blacklist" of judges who depart from the prescribed
Guidelines range. 149 CONG. REC. S5118 (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that some provisions may amount to "intimidation" of federal trial
judges. See Mark H. Allenbaugh, The PROTECT Act's Provisions, and the Attorney
General's Controversial Memo: An Assault Against the Federal Courts, FINDLAW, at
http://writ.findlaw.com/allenbaugh/20030813.html (Aug. 13, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
11. PROTECT Act, § 401(c), 117 Stat. 650, 669-70 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)
(2000)).
12. Id. § 401(h), 117 Stat. at 672 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(2000)).
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incidence of downward departures are substantially reduced";13 and
diminishes the voice of the judiciary on the Commission itself.
14
As one may expect, many federal judges responded angrily to the
new law. U.S. District Judge John S. Martin, declaring that he "no
longer want[ed] to be part of our unjust criminal justice system,"
announced his resignation in a New York Times op-ed.15 Judge
Bright of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote:
Let me say further that judges generally do not object to
appropriate guidelines for sentencing decisions but the time has
come for major reform in the system. I say in this concurring
opinion, as I have said in other sentencing opinions that I have
written, "Is anyone out there listening?"'
16
Even Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist has taken issue with some
of the Amendment's provisions.17 The Judicial Conference of the
United States, a panel of twenty-seven federal judges, voted
unanimously to ask Congress to repeal the Feeney Amendment. 8
But even as Congress was in the process of strengthening the
legal authority of the Guidelines, the Supreme Court was moving
inexorably towards invalidating them. Starting with its decision in
Apprendi v. New Jersey,19 the Court began to redefine the meaning of
the Sixth Amendment's jury trial right.2" The fate of the Guidelines
was all but sealed when the Court, in Blakely v. Washington,"
13. Id. § 401(m)(2)(A), 117 Stat. at 675 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2000)).
14. The SRA previously provided that at least three of the Commission's voting
members were to be members of the federal judiciary. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2000).
After the passage of the Feeney Amendment, federal judges may hold a maximum of
three seats on the Commission. § 401(n)(1), 117 Stat. at 675-76 (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 991(a)).
15. John S. Martin, Jr., Editorial, Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2003, at A31.
16. United States v. Flores, 336 F.3d 760, 768 (8th Cir. 2003) (Bright, J., concurring)
(quoting United States v. Alatorre, 207 F.3d 1078, 1080 (8th Cir. 2000) (Bright, J.,
concurring)).
17. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the Feeney Amendment will "'seriously
impair the ability of the courts to impose just and responsible sentences.' " 149 CONG.
REC. S5120 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (quoting letter from Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist to Senator Patrick Leahy (Apr. 3, 2003)). See Allenbaugh, supra note 10
(discussing downward departures and the federal judiciary's anger at the Feeney
Amendment).
18. Linda Greenhouse, Judges Seek Repeal of Law on Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 2003, at A23.
19. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
20. Id. at 490 (holding that a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that
authorizes an increase in the maximum sentence).
21. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
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invalidated Washington State's determinate sentencing scheme to the
extent that it permitted facts found only by a sentencing judge to
enhance a defendant's sentence beyond that which the jury verdict
alone would support." Thus, few were surprised when the Court,
squarely faced with the issue in United States v. Booker,23 invalidated
the Guidelines system on the same grounds.24 The Court's remedy,
on the other hand, was unexpected. Rather than engraft the Sixth
Amendment's requirement that the jury find all facts relevant to
increases in punishment, the Court struck just two provisions of the
SRA, rendering the Guidelines advisory,25 and subjecting sentences to
"reasonableness" review in the appellate courts.26 Though the Court
rendered the Guidelines advisory, it preserved a key provision that
requires sentencing courts to consider, among other factors, the
sentence prescribed by the Guidelines.27 Thus, the Guidelines are
now only advisory, but must be consulted.
That the Feeney Amendment and Booker push in opposite
directions is obvious. While the Feeney Amendment sought to
further curtail judicial discretion at sentencing by "mak[ing]
Guidelines sentencing even more mandatory than it had been,"28
Booker seemingly returned to the district courts more sentencing
discretion than they have enjoyed since the SRA's initial passage.
Yet Booker preserved both the Guidelines themselves and key
provisions of the Feeney Amendment, including the statement of
reasons required whenever a sentencing court departs from the
Guidelines range, and the reporting requirements that make those
reasons available to both Congress and the Attorney General.2 9
This Comment, after recounting a brief history of sentencing
reform,30 explores the current state of federal sentencing law by
analyzing in detail the key provisions of the Feeney Amendment31
and the Court's decision in Booker.32 It then examines the effects of
Booker on the Feeney Amendment and attempts to determine just
22. Id. at 2537.
23. 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).
24. Id. at 749-52 (majority opinion of Stevens, J.).
25. Id. at 764 (majority opinion of Breyer, J.).
26. Id. at 765 (majority opinion of Breyer, J.).
27. Id. at 767 (majority opinion of Breyer, J.).
28. Id. at 765 (majority opinion of Breyer, J.).
29. See infra Part tt for discussions of these Feeney Amendment requirements.
30. See infra Part I.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part III.A.
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how much discretion district courts enjoy after Booker.33 As brief
analysis of two recent district court opinions reveals, only time will
tell.
Yet, regardless of how much discretion sentencing judges enjoy
post-Booker, the combination of the multi-factored approach to
sentencing commanded by Booker and the Feeney Amendment's
requirement of written reasons for each departure from the
Guidelines presents district courts with an unprecedented
opportunity to regain the position envisioned for them by the SRA
and contribute to the formation of future sentencing policy. This
Comment explores that opportunity and draws attention to a recent
opinion that exemplifies the approach sentencing courts should take.34
As Justice Breyer observed, however, Congress is likely to have
the last word." Thus, this Comment concludes by suggesting to
Congress that it act only after careful study of the post-Booker
regime.36 Booker has brought the balance of power in sentencing law
and policy closer to the original intentions of the SRA than it has
been for years. Perhaps in reflecting on post-Booker decisions,
Congress will rediscover the valuable insights that sentencing courts
have to offer.
I. HISTORY
In the pre-Guidelines era, sentencing judges in the federal system
enjoyed virtually unfettered discretion.37 Because rehabilitation was
the dominant theory of punishment, people generally believed that an
offender's sentence should be tailored to fit the needs of each
individual defendant.3  The predominant players in sentencing
decisions were the judge, who set maximum and minimum terms of
imprisonment, and parole officers, who determined the actual time a
defendant spent in prison on the theory that a proper sentence could
not be formulated in advance.39 Sentencing decisions were subject to
33. See infra Part III.B.
34. See infra Part IV.
35. United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 768 (2005) (majority opinion of Breyer, J.).
36. See infra Part V.
37. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989); Berman, supra note 5, at
25.
38. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL
POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 3 (1981) (stating that rehabilitation was the dominant
theory of punishment until the late 1960s).
39. The Board of Parole was created by Congress in 1948. See Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 311, 62 Stat. 854 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4201), repealed by Pub. L. 98-473, § 218(a)(5),
1984 U.S.C.A.A.N. (98 Stat.) 2027. See also Robert W. Sweet et al., Towards a Common
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extremely deferential appellate review, leaving virtually no check on
the district courts' imposition of sentences or the parole boards'
eligibility decisions.40 By the mid-1970s the rehabilitative model
began to fall into disrepute and people became increasingly
concerned with the erratic and widely disparate sentences meted out
to criminal defendants. 41  Especially distressing to many was the
growing body of evidence indicating that an offender's race, socio-
economic class, and gender accounted for many of the disparities.2
Many people blamed the disparities on the judiciary.43
Because unguided discretion was viewed as the principal cause of
sentencing disparities, reformers attempted to formulate mechanisms
that would curtail judicial discretion and rationalize the sentencing
process.44 The most influential figure in the reform movement was
District Judge Marvin E. Frankel, whom Senator Edward M.
Kennedy, the primary proponent of the SRA, called the "father of
sentencing reform. '45 Judge Frankel pointed to the system's failure to
articulate punishment's underlying rationale as one of the
predominant causes of disparity, and advocated the creation of an
independent agency that would research the underlying purposes of
punishment and propose sentencing guidelines based upon those
Law of Sentencing: Developing Judicial Precedent in Cyberspace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
927, 930 (1996) (noting that the parole board ultimately decided the length of the sentence
for any given defendant).
40. See, e.g., Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) ("We begin with
the general proposition that once it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations
set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end.").
41. A report by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary outlined the results of a study
in which forty-three district court judges were asked to impose a punishment for nearly
identical cases. The disparity between the results was astounding. For example, the most
severe sentence imposed on a bank robber was eighteen years in prison plus a fine of five
thousand dollars while the least severe sentence was three years in prison. S. REP. No. 98-
225, at 41-44 (1983).
42. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1988) (describing race-based
disparities in pre-Guidelines sentencing practices); Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing
Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883,
895 (1990) (noting several studies finding that race, gender, income and religion influenced
judicial sentencing decisions).
43. For example, Judge Marvin E. Frankel declared that sentences should not "turn
so arbitrarily upon the variegated passions and prejudices of individual judges." Marvin
E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
44. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT
ORDER 61-124 (1973) (advocating the creation of an independent agency, the duty of
which would be formulating standards to guide judicial sentencing discretion; suggesting
the implementation of appellate review for all sentences; and proposing that sentences
should be crafted according to the general purposes of punishment).
45. 128 CONG. REC. S26,503 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
2005] A CRITIQUE OF THE FEENEY AMENDMENT 743
purposes.46 Reformers deemed Congress ill-equipped to undertake
this project for two reasons. First, the rulemaking process would be
evolutionary by necessity and Congress lacked the time or the interest
to pay constant attention to the process.47 Second, electoral pressures
would give Congress a tendency to overreact to headlines and favor
toughness over justice.48  Reformers believed that an independent
agency of knowledgeable experts would not suffer from these
defects.49
Another important aspect of Judge Frankel's model was the
establishment of more rigorous appellate review of sentencing
decisions, especially when judges decided to depart from the
established standards." This would require trial judges to provide
written reasons for the sentence imposed, which would then be
subject to review.51 Other reformers noted that these written reasons,
in turn, would provide the agency with valuable information it could
use as it continually refined the sentencing standards.52 This was to be
the judiciary's contribution to the development of principled
sentencing rules-a common law from which the agency could draw
on the experience of the judiciary in order to gradually produce a just
sentencing system. 3
Senator Kennedy introduced a bill in 1975 based primarily on
Judge Frankel's ideas. 4 Under Kennedy's plan:
The sentencing guidelines will recommend to the sentencing
46. See Frankel, supra note 43, at 50-51.
47. See id. at 50 ("[Tlhe need for revision of the law is not a one-time thing; the gross
inadequacies of the existing situation require continuing study and reform.").
48. See FRANKEL, supra note 44, at 119 (noting that "legislative action tends to be
sporadic and impassioned, responding in haste to momentary crises, lapsing then into the
accustomed state of inattention").
49. Id. at 119-20.
50. See id. at 75-85.
51. Id.
52. See 2003 U.S.S.G.,supra note 3, § 1A1.1 cmt. Editorial Note 4(b) ("By monitoring
when courts depart from the guidelines and by analyzing their stated reasons for doing so,
the Commission, over time, will be able to create more accurate guidelines that specify
precisely where departures should and should not be permitted.").
53. See Morris, supra note 6, at 275. Like Judge Frankel, Professor Morris played a
prominent role in the reform movement that culminated in the SRA. See S. REP. No. 98-
225, at 37 (1983).
54. See S. 2699, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975). It is interesting that the SRA had broad
bipartisan support. Though Senator Kennedy was the primary proponent of the bill, the
Republican senator from South Carolina, Strom Thurmond, also played a major role in
drumming up congressional support for sentencing reform. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 37;
see also Edward M. Kennedy, Sentencing Reform-An Evolutionary Process, 3 F. SENT. R.
271, 271 (1991) (lauding Senator Thurmond's efforts to gather support for the bill).
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judge an appropriate kind and range of sentence for a given
category of offense committed by a given category of
offender.... If the judge finds an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance present in the case that was not adequately
considered in the formulation of the guidelines and that should
result in a sentence different from that recommended in the
guidelines, the judge may sentence the defendant outside the
guidelines. A sentence that is above the guidelines may be
appealed by the defendant; a sentence below the guidelines
may be appealed by the government.55
Because of the arbitrary and discriminatory sentencing decisions of
the past, people were rightly skeptical of the relevance of individual
offender characteristics to sentencing decisions. Senator Kennedy,
however, was confident that the Guideline system's structure and its
relative transparency would eliminate the risk of arbitrary and
discriminatory sentencing, and still take advantage of the trial bench's
individualistic, case-by-case perspective.56
The SRA, the culmination of Senator Kennedy's and Judge
Frankel's efforts, made three primary changes in the federal
sentencing system: it abolished parole, established appellate review
of sentencing decisions,58 and created the Sentencing Commission to
formulate a set of guidelines to restrict judicial sentencing
discretion.59
The SRA ordered the Commission to establish guidelines that
would:
[P]rovide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility
to permit individualized sentences when warranted by
55. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 51-52 (1983) (citations omitted). See generally Edward
M. Kennedy, Criminal Sentencing: A Game of Chance, 60 JUDICATURE 208 (1976)
(outlining the major provisions of his proposed bill).
56. See Kennedy, supra note 54, at 271.
57. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (2000) (repealed 1984).
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2000) (establishing "reasonableness" review for sentencing
decisions). As explained later, the Feeney Amendment amended this provision to provide
for de novo review in certain circumstances. See infra notes 105-09, and accompanying
text. Booker, however, invalidated § 3742(e), and found implied in the SRA the same
"reasonableness" standard of review that existed before the Feeney Amendment. See
United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 765 (2005).
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2000) (establishing the Sentencing Commission as an
independent agency within the judicial branch).
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mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the
establishment of general sentencing practices.60
The SRA further instructed the Commission to promulgate
guidelines setting maximum and minimum punishments, the range
between which could not vary more than twenty-five percent or six
months, whichever is greater.6'
Additionally, courts were to:
[I]mpose a sentence of the kind, and within the range
[established by the Commission] unless the court found that
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind,
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that
should result in a sentence different from that described.62
This is the manner in which the departure mechanism63 was built into
the SRA. The SRA permitted courts to depart from the Guidelines,
not only when the Commission had not considered a factor at all, but
also when the Commission had not considered the factor to an
adequate degree given the circumstances of a particular case.
The Commission viewed its duty as two-fold. In the introduction
to the Guidelines Manual, which sets out the Guidelines along with
60. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2000).
61. Id. at § 994(b)(2). The only exception is that if the minimum sentence is thirty
years or more, then the maximum may be a life sentence. Id.
The SRA also directed the district courts to consider the purposes of punishment
when deciding on a sentence to impose. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000). The Act set forth
four basic purposes of punishment-retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation-and directed the Commission to develop policies that furthered these
goals. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1). This provision was invalidated in Booker because it made
the Guidelines mandatory. United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 764 (2005); see also
supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
63. The Guidelines prescribe ranges for permissible sentences and a "departure"
occurs when the judge sentences a defendant to a prison term outside that range. See 2003
U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 1A1.1 cmt. Editorial Note 4(c). The Guidelines direct judges to
depart in certain specific instances, such as when the defendant has provided "substantial
assistance" to the government in investigation or prosecution of another person, but only
upon motion by the government. See id. § 5K1.1. The Guidelines also direct judges to
depart whenever the court finds aggravating or mitigating circumstances of a kind or to a
degree not adequately taken into account by the Commission. See id. § 5K2.0. Cases in
which the district court departed downward from the Guidelines without a substantial
assistance motion by the prosecutor accounted for 12.1 percent of total cases in 1997 and
accounted for 18.3 percent of total cases in 2001. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 51 (2001) [hereinafter
SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001/fig-g.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
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instructions for applying them, the Commission noted that "Congress
sought uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in
sentences imposed by different federal courts for similarly criminal
conduct by similar offenders."64 Congress also "sought
proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes
appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of different
severity."'65 The Commission realized that tension exists between
these two principles and, though attempting to forge a compromise,
acknowledged that there is "no completely satisfying solution to this
practical stalemate. 66
The Commission also encountered considerable difficulty in
articulating an underlying philosophy of punishment. Specifically, the
Commissioners were unable to agree on whether deterrence or
retribution should be the underlying rationale of the system.67 They
concluded, however, that resolution of the question was not necessary
to their purposes because "the application of either philosophy will
produce the same or similar results."'  Instead of articulating an
underlying philosophy, the Commission used an empirical approach,
looking to past judicial sentencing practices to establish a starting
point from which the Guidelines could evolve.69 The Commission
analyzed data from thousands of previous cases and compiled a list of
64. 2003 U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 1A1.1 cmt. Editorial Note 3 (emphasis in original).
65. Id.
66. Id. The problem here is one of balancing. Though the sentencing movement
targeted disparity as the principal cause of injustice in pre-Guidelines sentencing practice,
an increased insistence on uniformity in sentencing may result in injustice as well. In one
sense the sole obligation of the Commission was to find the proper balance between these
two goals.
67. See 2003 U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 1A1.1 cmt. Editorial Note 3 (admitting an
inability to reconcile philosophical differences but suggesting that by using an empirical-
based approach and declining to use one underlying philosophy over another, the
Guidelines should gain the benefit of widespread acceptance).
68. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A3 (2002) [hereinafter
2002 U.S.S.G.]; see also Breyer, supra note 42, at 1, 15-18 (noting that the institutional
nature of the group writing process precluded the Commission from settling on a single
purpose).
69. 2003 U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 1A1.1 cmt. Editorial Note 3. This assertion has met
some skepticism. One commentator noted that "[hIad past judicial sentencing practice
been the model, the guidelines would not be nearly so severe." Andrew von Hirsch,
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Do They Provide Principled Guidance?, 27 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 367, 373 (1990). This view may have some merit. One study showed that the
average time served under the Guidelines system is more than twice the time served under
the pre-Guidelines system. Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No
End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 164 (1991). The use of past practice as a
starting point is contemplated by the SRA, but the Act also instructs the Commission to
formulate guidelines that reflect the fact that pre-Guidelines sentences do not always
correlate to the seriousness of the offense. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2000).
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factors that the courts routinely found relevant to the imposition of a
sentence.7° One result of this process was a list of factors deemed
"not ordinarily relevant."'71 For the most part, these factors reflected
individual offender characteristics, the judicial consideration of which
was widely understood to be one of the root causes of the arbitrary
and discriminatory sentencing practices of the past. While the courts
were not prohibited from using these factors as a basis for departure,
the Commission determined that such departures should be very
rare.72 As a result of its research, the Commission deviated from pre-
Guidelines practice in two important respects. First, it apparently felt
compelled to accommodate the growing congressional trend of
promulgating mandatory minimum statutes.73  Second, the
Commission decided that white-collar crime was not being punished
severely enough in proportion to other criminal acts.74
The Commission stressed on more than one occasion that the
Guideline-writing process was an evolutionary one.75  It
acknowledged that it is difficult to prescribe "a single set of guidelines
that encompasses the vast range of human conduct potentially
70. 2003 U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 1A1.1 cmt. Editorial Note 3.
71. Chapter 5, Part H of the Guidelines Manual lists several individual offender
characteristics that are "not ordinarily relevant" to sentencing decisions, including age,
educational and vocational skills, mental and emotional conditions, physical condition,
employment record, and family ties. See id. §§ 5H1.1 to 1.6. The SRA directs the
Commission to assure that the Guidelines "reflect the general inappropriateness of
considering" many of the factors that the Commission deemed "not ordinarily relevant."
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d); 2003 U.S.S.G., supra note 3, §§ 5H1.1 to 1.6. But the legislative
history of the Act emphasizes that these factors may be appropriately considered in some
cases and that the Commission should evaluate their relevance in certain situations. S.
REP. No. 98-225, at 175 (1983).
72. 2003 U.S.S.G., supra note 3, ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt. (noting that these
factors may be relevant to a decision to depart from the Guidelines in "exceptional
cases").
73. See 2003 U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 1A1.1 cmt. Editorial Note 3 (as amended in
1990) (noting that the incorporation of congressional mandatory minimum statutes into
the Guidelines is the principal cause of the marked increase in the federal prison
population in the post-Guidelines era); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (2000) (providing a
minimum penalty of ten years imprisonment for causing death or kidnapping in the course
of a bank robbery); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2000) (providing a minimum penalty of ten
years imprisonment for possession of one kilogram of heroin or five kilograms of cocaine);
21 U.S.C. § 845(a) (2000) (providing a minimum penalty of one year imprisonment for
distribution or manufacture of a controlled substance within one thousand feet of a school
or college).
74. See 2002 U.S.S.G., supra note 68, § 1A3 (noting that its analysis of past practice
"revealed inconsistencies in treatment, such as punishing economic crime less severely
than other apparently equivalent behavior").
75. See 2003 U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 1AI1 at cmt. Editorial Notes 2, 3.
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relevant to a sentencing decision."76 The Commission also noted,
however, that to do so at that point was unnecessary because, "[b]y
monitoring when courts depart from the guidelines and by analyzing
their stated reasons for doing so, the Commission, over time, will be
able to create more accurate guidelines that specify precisely where
departures should and should not be permitted."77  Thus, the
Commission seemed to be enlisting the help of the experienced
federal judiciary just as Judge Frankel and Senator Kennedy had
hoped. The Commission intended that the judiciary:
[T]reat each guideline as carving out a "heartland," a set of
typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline
describes. When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a
particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct
significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider
whether a departure is warranted.78
But the Commission sent mixed messages to the courts about the
propriety of departure. Because the Commission believed it had
taken all relevant factors into account, it warned courts that relevant
factors not reflected in the Guidelines will occur rarely and that
departures "will be highly unusual."79
In order to help achieve the SRA's goals of uniformity and
proportionality, the Commission originally intended to create a "real
offense" system that punished criminals according to their actual
conduct rather than the offenses with which they are formally
charged.8" It was unable, however, to find a practical way to
assimilate the vast range of human conduct into a workable system.81
Thus, the Commission compromised and adopted a mixed real
offense and charge-based system that "take[s] account of a number of
important, commonly occurring real offense elements such as role in
the offense, the presence of a gun, or the amount of money actually
taken."82
When the Guidelines were formally implemented on November
1, 1987, the federal judiciary's reaction was less than enthusiastic.
Many federal judges opposed the Guidelines and a few even resigned
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as a result." Members of the judiciary articulated two primary
criticisms of the Guidelines. The first was that sentences under the
Guidelines were unfairly severe."4 One commentator noted that the
sentences imposed under the Guidelines are more severe than those
in any of the states.85 Second and related, many judges believed that
the Commission unduly stressed the congressional mandate of
uniformity over proportionality.86 This obsession with uniformity has
caused an upward adjustment of Guideline ranges in general as the
Commission struggles to assimilate Congress's unusually severe
mandatory minimum statutes. 7 The Commission is certainly not
commanded to incorporate Congress's mandatory minimums into the
Guidelines structure and could simply work around them; but it
apparently perceives a source of disparity in allowing the statutes to
stand as anomalies within an otherwise comprehensive system.'
83. Michael M. Mihm & Nancy Gertner, Teaching Judges How to Sentence, 11 FED.
SENT. R. 96, 96-98 (1998). The opposition by the federal judges is evidenced by the fact
that in a relatively short time there were over two hundred rulings declaring the
Guidelines unconstitutional, mostly on separation of powers grounds. See, e.g., United
States v. Dahlin, 701 F. Supp. 148, 148 (N.D. 111. 1988) (finding the creation of the
Commission within the judicial branch to be an unconstitutional delegation of
congressional authority); United States v. Perez, 696 F. Supp. 55, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding the SRA unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds); United States v.
Whyte, 694 F. Supp. 1194, 1195 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (same). The Supreme Court settled the
constitutionality of the Guidelines in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
84. Even Justice Anthony Kennedy who has been consistently tough on crime has
said, "Our resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our sentences too long."
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting
(Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-
03.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
85. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines:
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1690 (1992).
86. See, e.g., Henry Weinstein & David Rosenzweig, How Judges Will Use Discretion
is the Big Question, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at 24 (quoting U.S. District Judge David 0.
Carter: "Uniformity under the sentencing guidelines was a shield for defendants who
deserved harsher sentences and a sword that struck down rehabilitation for those who
deserved leniency.").
87. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM. 102D CONG., SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 20
(1991) (stating that the Commission has tried to incorporate the mandatory minimum
statutes into the Guidelines); see also Berman, supra note 6, at 109 (noting that "the
Commission, concerned about potential disparities created by the application of
mandatory sentencing terms, has continually pegged the severity of all guideline sentences
to the harsh scale of Congress' mandatories").
88. For example, assume that the Commission has determined that possession of five
hundred grams of marijuana is equivalent in seriousness to grand larceny and establishes a
presumptive range in punishment for both of two years imprisonment. If Congress passes
a mandatory minimum statute setting five years as the minimum for possession of five
hundred grams of marijuana, the Commission may perceive a disparity and raise the
penalties for grand larceny for the sake of consistency.
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II. THE FEENEY AMENDMENT
The primary purposes of the Feeney Amendment were to further
restrict judicial discretion at sentencing, and reduce the judiciary's
role in the formulation of sentencing policy.89 The Amendment seeks
to achieve these goals through a number of mechanisms.
First, the Amendment imposes new requirements on sentencing
judges. Whenever a sentencing judge departs from the Guidelines,
the Feeney Amendment requires that reasons for the sentence be
stated "with specificity in the written order of' judgment and
commitment, except to the extent that the court relies upon
statements received in camera... "90 Prior to the Feeney
Amendment, judges were only required to state their reasons for
departure in open court.9' As discussed in Part III, this provision,
while certainly imposing additional requirements on district court
judges, also provides them with a forum for elaboration of their
reasons for imposing certain sentences.'
Additionally, the chief judge of each district must "ensure that,
within 30 days following entry of judgment in every criminal case,"
the court submits to the Commission a report that includes the
offense, demographic information about the offender, the judgment
and commitment order, the statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed, any plea agreement, the indictment, the pre-sentence
report, and any other information the Commission deems
appropriate.93 This provision amends 28 U.S.C. § 994(w), which
previously required the "appropriate judge or officer" to submit the
report which needed to contain only the sentence, a description of the
offense, personal characteristics of the offender, information
regarding factors relevant under the guidelines, and other
information the Commission found appropriate.94 The clear purpose
89. See 149 CONG. REC. $5114-S5116 (2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (expressing
concerns about judges' downward departures from the Guidelines with respect to crimes
against children and explaining how the PROTECT Act addresses those concerns).
90. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(c)(1), 117 Stat. 650, 669 (2003)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(c)(2) (West Supp. 2004)).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2000) (amended 2003).
92. As also explained in Part III, the Booker decision further expands this
opportunity.
93. PROTECT Act, § 401(h), 117 Stat. at 672 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(w) (West
Supp. 2004)).
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(w) (2000) (amended 2003). The Commission, though not
mandated by Congress, previously required almost the same information required by the
Amendment save the statement of purposes. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 63, at iii (listing
all requirements except the statement of purposes).
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of the new provision is to hold a single individual responsible for the
report in order to ensure that the Commission receives the
information. This in itself is not necessarily a bad thing; after all, if
the Commission is to improve the Guidelines it needs information on
how they are being implemented in practice.
But read in light of the surrounding provisions, these reporting
requirements evidence congressional distrust of the federal trial
bench. The Commission is directed to make the written reports and
underlying records available to the House and Senate Committees on
the Judiciary." The Amendment also requires the Commission to
provide Congress with an annual report detailing which districts, in
the Commission's view, are not complying with the reporting
requirements.96 The Commission also must make available to the
Attorney General any data on sentences that it keeps in electronic
form.97  Because the Commission maintains a comprehensive
electronic "Integrated Case Management System," 98 this provision
virtually ensures the Attorney General access to all of the
information the Commission possesses.
This degree of oversight by the elected branches is remarkable in
a society that so greatly values the independence of its judiciary.
True, departures serve an informational function to help the
Commission fine-tune the Guidelines over time and are thus open
and transparent by design; but, the congressional judiciary
committees are not directly involved in refining the Guidelines, and
the Attorney General serves the Commission in only an ex officio
capacity.99 The underlying purpose of these provisions must be to
coerce the district courts through exposure. This need to coerce,
however, presupposes a judiciary that is hostile to the SRA program.
Instead of inviting the trial bench to air its views to the Commission,
these reporting provisions positively discourage the judiciary from
expressing an opinion contrary to that of the Commission's through
the very mechanism-departures-specifically designed for that
purpose.
In addition to imposing more rigorous reporting requirements,
the Amendment seeks to further circumscribe the discretion
exercised by the courts under the SRA. Previously the courts were
95. § 401(h)(2), 117 Stat. at 672.
96. § 401 (h)(3).
97. § 401 (h)(4).
98. See Sweet et al., supra note 39, at 938.
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
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permitted to reduce the sentence one levell °° if the offender promptly
provided "complete information to the government concerning his
own involvement in the offense" or promptly notified the government
that he intended to plead guilty. 101 According to the Commission,
because "[t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a
defendant's acceptance of responsibility," the decision in these
situations rested solely with the trial judge and was "entitled to great
deference on review. ' '1°2 Under the Feeney Amendment, this
sentencing reduction is now only available for a prompt guilty plea
and then only upon a motion from the government.103 Rather than
eliminating discretionary choice, this provision merely shifts the
discretion from judge to prosecutor.'34
The Amendment also sought to reduce the incidence of
downward departures by establishing de novo review of sentences
imposed outside of the Guideline range in the following four
circumstances: if the district court fails to provide a written statement
of reasons; if the sentence departs based on a factor that does not
advance the objectives set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); 15 if the
sentence is not authorized under § 3553(b); 1 6 or, if the sentence is not
justified by the facts of the case. 7 This provision essentially
100. A decrease of one level generally lowers the length of imprisonment by three to
nine months. See 2003 U.S.S.G., supra note 3, Sentencing Table, § 5A. The percentage
drop in the sentence varies according to the severity of the sentence. Id.
101. See 2002 U.S.S.G., supra note 63, § 3El.1(b).
102. Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. 5. The commentary, as well as the policy statements in the
Guidelines Manual, is authoritative and thus binding on the courts. Id. § 1B1.7 ("[Flailure
to follow such commentary could constitute an incorrect application of the guidelines,
subjecting the sentence to possible reversal on appeal.").
103. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(g)(1), 117 Stat. 650, 671 (2003).
104. Furthermore, the Amendment expressly precludes judges from departing based
on an aggregation of factors that standing alone would be insufficient to warrant a
departure. See § 401(f), 117 Stat. at 671.
105. The purposes laid out in § 3553(a)(2) are the commonly stated and often
contested purposes of punishment: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) states that:
[T]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range [established
by the Guidelines] unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that
should result in a sentence different from that described.
Id. § 3553(b)(1). The Supreme Court invalidated this provision in Booker. See infra notes
159-60 and accompanying text.
107. PROTECT Act, § 401(d), 117 Stat. at 670. These bases of reversal involve
questions of law. The trial judge's factual determinations are still reviewable only under a
"clearly erroneous" standard. See 149 CONG. REC. S5116 (2003) (statement of Sen.
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overruled the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Koon v. United
States"' in which the Court, reasoning that district courts had "an
institutional advantage over appellate courts in making [sentencing]
determinations," interpreted review for "reasonableness" to establish
abuse of discretion as the proper standard of review for sentences
that departed from the Guidelines. 10 9 As explained in greater detail
below, the Booker decision eliminated de novo review of sentencing
decisions and reinstated "reasonableness" as the governing
standard. 1 °
By their nature, appellate courts approach cases from a point
more removed from the human elements of each particular case. It is
the trial bench's experience with the actual human beings involved in
the cases that makes district court judges such a valuable source of
information for the Commission in the eyes of the SRA. By directing
appellate courts to review departures as if they were deciding the case
in the first instance, the Feeney Amendment indicates Congress's
view that the trial judge's first-hand perspective has little, if anything,
to add to individual sentencing determinations.
While the provisions discussed above either chill departures
through exposure or limit the discretion to depart altogether, they all
address the judiciary's adjudicative role in sentencing, not its role on
the Commission itself. But Congress thought of that, too. The seven-
member Commission can now consist of a maximum rather than a
minimum of three federal judges, 1 ' thus allowing the judiciary only a
minority voice in an agency within its own branch.
The bulk of the Amendment targets trial judges, but certain
provisions directly address the Commission as well. The Commission
is permanently precluded from amending the provisions related to
acceptance of responsibility' 2 and may not introduce any new
grounds for departure until May 1, 2005."' The Act also directs the
Commission to promulgate "appropriate amendments ... to ensure
that the incidence of downward departures are substantially
Hatch).
108. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
109. See id. at 98-99. Interestingly, the Court noted that "[t]o ignore the district court's
special competence-about the 'ordinariness' or 'unusualness' of a particular case-would
risk depriving the Sentencing Commission of an important source of information, namely,
the reactions of the trial judge to the fact-specific circumstances of the case." Id. at 99
(quoting United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 951 (1st Cir. 1993)).
110. See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
111. § 401(n)(1), 117 Stat. at 676.
112. § 4010)(4), 117 Stat. at 673.
113. § 4010)(2), 117 Stat. at 673.
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reduced."'14
The Commission dutifully responded to these directives in the
2003 version of the Guidelines Manual. For instance, it expressly
eliminated gambling addiction as a basis for departure,1 5 and made
clear that a departure based on an offender's role in the offense,
however minor, is also not permitted." 6  The Commission also
thoroughly revised its general policy statement on departures. The
previous manual permitted departures based on factors not taken into
account by the commission "under some circumstances.""' 7 It allowed
departures based on factors present in a case to a degree not taken
into account by the Commission under "unusual circumstances.""' 8
The 2003 manual advised in stronger language that departures on
either of these grounds are available only in "exceptional cases." ' 9
The fundamental assumption underlying the Feeney
Amendment, that judicial discretion in sentencing is the principal
problem with the Guidelines system, is misconceived. Unless one
contends that the Guidelines in their present form are capable of
reaching a just result in all cases, one must admit that discretion to
depart from the Guidelines is a necessary and even desirable
mechanism for both reaching just results and for providing the
Commission with the information necessary to improve the
Guidelines. As stated in the Senate Committee Report, "the purpose
of the Guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the fairness
and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual offender, not to
eliminate the thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences."110
Practical necessity forced the Commission to create a system with
a limited number of categories and factors in order for the system to
be workable. 2' Thus, the Commission had to compromise absolute
accuracy in each case to develop a sentencing structure that was
comprehensible and not too difficult to apply.'22 The inevitable result
of such a system is that it cannot possibly reach the proper and just
114. § 401(m)(2)(A), 117 Stat. at 675.
115. 2003 U.S.S.G., supra note3, § 5H1.4.
116. Id. § 5H1.7
117. See 2002 U.S.S.G., supra note 68, § 5k2.0.
118. Id.
119. See 2003 U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 5K2.0(a)(2)(B) & (a)(3).
120. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52 (1983)..
121. 2003 U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 1A1.1 cmt. Editorial Note 3.
122. See Breyer, supra note 42, at 8-12 (acknowledging the Commission's compromise
of real and charge offense systems to avoid the risk of unfairness and unworkability). But
see Berman, supra note 5, at 100-01 (noting that many judges still believe the Guidelines
to be overly complex and unworkable).
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result in all cases. The Commission itself is cognizant of this problem
and thus permits departures from the Guidelines when the case
before the court falls outside of the "heartland" that embodies the
conduct that each guideline described.123 The Commission, however,
warned that such departures would be appropriate in few cases
because "[r]elevant distinctions not reflected in the guidelines
probably will occur rarely." '124 The assumption upon which this
assertion rests is that the Commission, in its analysis of past practice
and in its continuing analysis of sentencing practices, has been
successful in identifying the factors that judges ordinarily take into
account. But given that judges in the pre-Guidelines system were not
required to give reasons for the sentences imposed, the information
available to the Commission was necessarily incomplete.
Some commentators believe that the Commission's gravest
mistake was its failure to strike the proper balance between
uniformity and proportionality. 12 15  The goal of the SRA was to
eliminate unwarranted disparity, not disparity per se.126 When the
Guidelines set a range of punishment that would result in excessive
uniformity when applied to a particular case, it is the duty of the court
to depart from the Guidelines in order to achieve the goal of
proportionality. Departures are not, therefore, necessarily violations
of the Guidelines; indeed, at times a failure to depart would violate
the Guidelines.
Furthermore, the departure mechanism was intended to be the
primary way in which the judiciary was to be involved in the
Guidelines-writing process. 12' The Guidelines system was originally
conceived as a joint effort between Congress, the Commission, and
the judiciary. Congress was to set out broad parameters for the
promulgation and evolution of a set of guidelines that takes
advantage of the system-wide perspective of expert commissioners
and the case-level experience of the federal judiciary;128 the
Commission was to issue a set of Guidelines; 129 and the judiciary was
123. 2003 U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 1A1.1 cmt. Editorial Note 4(b).
124. See 2002 U.S.S.G., supra note 68, § 1A3.
125. See generally Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 851-53 (arguing that excessive
uniformity leads to exactly the type of problems the SRA was designed to eliminate).
126. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(f) (2000) (directing the Commission to issue Guidelines with
the aim of "providing certainty and fairness in sentencing and reducing unwarranted
sentencing disparities"); see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 161 (1983) ("The key word in
discussing unwarranted sentencing disparity is 'unwarranted.' ").
127. See supra notes 3-4, 63 and accompanying text.
128. Berman, supra note 5, at 96.
129. Id. at 37-38.
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to state specific reasons for departures, which in turn would provide
meaningful feedback that the Commission could use to fine-tune the
Guidelines. 3 °
The difference in institutional perspective between the
Commission and the judiciary cannot be overstated. While the
Commission has the advantage of viewing the system in the abstract
from a distance, trial judges are in the unique position to confront
cases in an individualized way. Therefore, the Commission should
welcome the comments of a judge who, in confronting cases from this
"micro" perspective, believes that a particular sentence imposed
under the Guidelines system is too long or too short.
Congress's apparent association of departures with the disparity
that existed in the pre-Guidelines system ignores important
differences. Under the pre-Guidelines system, judges were not
required to give reasons and rarely did so.' This precluded the
development of a common law of sentencing that could potentially
result in an accumulated body of reasoned opinions available to other
judges for consultation. It also kept the sentencing process hidden
from public view and, therefore, invited the arbitrary and
discriminatory practices that the SRA was designed to prevent.132
Only the judge knew why a particular sentence was imposed on a
particular offender, and there was no mechanism by which that
decision could be checked or criticized.133
Departures under the Guidelines, by contrast, are open and
subject to review both by the appellate courts and by the
Commission. Even before the Feeney Amendment (but after the
creation of the Guidelines system), judges were required to state
reasons for departures,3 albeit not written ones, and these reasons,
when available, went both to the Commission for analysis 3' and upon
appeal to the appellate courts for reasonableness review. 36
Departures may not always be warranted, but they occur in the open
and, therefore, do not pose the same risk of hidden evasion and
unchecked error that existed in the pre-Guidelines era.'37
Despite the necessity of departures to the fair and accurate
130. Id.
131. See Frankel, supra note 43, at 9-16.
132. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
133. See Frankel, supra note 43, at 9-16
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (2000).
135. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 63, at iii.
136. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000) (superseded by United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct.
738 (2005)).
137. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
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administration of the Guidelines system, departures, if they occur too
frequently, undeniably have the potential to undermine the
Guidelines system by introducing an undesirable level of disparity
and unpredictability into the system. The Congressional Record
reveals that many of the proponents of the Feeney Amendment were
concerned about the marked increase in departures over the last five
years. 38 The increase may be cause for concern, but the simple fact
that departures are on the increase does not necessarily mean that
federal district court judges have too much discretion.
Though departures specifically requested by the government 13 9
are now outnumbered by those not specifically requested by the
government, the American Bar Association reported to Congress that
the government agreed to seventy-nine percent of downward
departures and did not appeal them.4 ° The fact that the government
acquiesces in these departures suggests that the cause of the increase
in departures is not "soft on crime" federal judges.' 41 Furthermore,
departures in border districts that have special "fast track" departure
policies designed to manage the enormous load of immigration cases
in those districts account for almost seventy percent of the increase in
the departure rate over the last few years . 42 All of these "fast track"
138. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. H3061 (2003) (statement of Rep. Feeney). Indeed, the
rate of departures not explicitly requested by the government (i.e., non-substantial
assistance departures) rose from 12.1 percent in 1997 to 18.3 percent in 2001. See
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 63, at 51.
139. Substantial assistance departures are departures made by the court "[u]pon
motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in
the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense." 2003
U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 5Kl.1. Prior to the passage of the Feeney Amendment, this was
the only type of departure that required explicit governmental authorization. The Feeney
Amendment requires a governmental motion for any "acceptance of responsibility"
adjustment as well. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401(g)(1), 117 Stat. 650, 671
(2003).
140. See 149 CONG. REC. H3067 (2003) (statement of Rep. Scott).
141. See 149 CONG. REC. S5115 (2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (calling downward
departures "soft-on-crime departures").
142. See Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Secretary, U.S. Sentencing
Commission, to Orrin G. Hatch, Senator (Apr. 3, 2003), reprinted in 149 CONG. REC.
S5120-S5121 (statement of Sen. Kennedy). "Fast track" proceedings have been
authorized by Congress in certain districts in the Southwest in order to expedite the
enormous number of immigration-related cases decided in those districts. See
Greenhouse, supra note 18. In exchange for a guilty plea, defendants in these immigration
cases may receive a sentence reduced further than that authorized by the Guidelines for
acceptance of responsibility. See 149 CONG. REC. S5119 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); cf.
2003 U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 3E1.1 (allowing a reduced sentence when a defendant
accepts responsibility). The degree to which "fast track" proceedings have caused the
increase in departure rates is unclear. See Lewis J. Liman, Protect Act § 401(m): Chance
to Revise Sentencing Guidelines, August 27, 2003, N.Y. L.J. 3, 7 (noting that there is
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departures have governmental support.'43 If these "fast track"
departures are excluded in calculating the percentage of cases with
non-substantial assistance departures, the percentage of cases in
which non-substantial assistance downward departures occur drops to
a mere ten percent of total cases."
This is not to suggest that the recent increase in downward
departures may not be cause for concern. As Senator Hatch pointed
out, twenty percent of downward departures are based upon grounds
not specifically mentioned in the Guidelines."a The point is that the
specific causes of the increase in departures are likely varied and
complex, and not simply attributable to the leniency of the federal
judiciary. A number of questions are left unanswered, however. For
example, if the rate of the departures is indeed antithetical to the
Guidelines system, why does the government support so many of
them? Is the increase in the rate of departures the result of increases
in departures in certain types of cases? Are there some specific
unenumerated grounds for departure that the courts rely on more
than others? These are important questions that warrant extensive
study and debate, which the rushed passage of the Feeney
Amendment precluded. As it turns out, the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Booker gives Congress the opportunity to
try again.
III. UNITED STATES V. BOOKER
The Court's decision in Booker worked significant changes in the
sentencing system as modified by Congress in the Feeney
Amendment, yet also left much of the system untouched. This Part
will first explain the essential holdings of the Booker decision. It will
then evaluate the changes the decision made to the post-Feeney
Guidelines system.
evidence showing that seventy percent of the increase in downward departures since the
Supreme Court's decision in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), is attributable
solely to "fast track" dispositions in the Southwest).
143. See Letter from American Bar Association to Rep. Scott (Apr. 9, 2003), reprinted
in 149 CONG. REC. H3067 (statement of Rep. Scott.); Memorandum from the Department
of Justice, to All Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
144. See 149 CONG. REC. S5119 (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Senator Kennedy also
noted that the Congress that passed the SRA in 1984 contemplated a departure rate of
twenty percent. By that estimate departures occur far less frequently than originally
anticipated. See id. at S5134. For perspective, though, upward departures occurred in
only 0.6 percent of cases in 2001. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 63, at 51.
145. See 149 CONG. REC. S5115 (Statement of Sen. Hatch).
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A. The Booker Decision
The decision contained two distinct majority opinions: the
"constitutional" opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, which declared
the Guidelines system to be unconstitutional, and the "remedial"
decision, authored by Justice Breyer, which rendered the Guidelines
advisory. Each opinion is discussed in turn.
1. The Constitutional Decision
The Court's decision declaring the Guidelines to be
unconstitutional was widely anticipated, especially following Blakely
146v. Washington, in which the Court invalidated the state of
Washington's determinate sentencing system. In Blakely, the
defendant pleaded guilty to the kidnapping of his estranged wife. The
facts contained in his plea supported a maximum sentence of fifty-
three months, but the judge, pursuant to state law, imposed an
''exceptional" sentence of ninety months upon a judicial finding that
the defendant had acted with "deliberate cruelty.' 1 47 The Court held
that the sentencing enhancement violated the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial under the rule set forth in Apprendi
v. New Jersey:1" " 'Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury [or admitted by the defendant],
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' "149
As Justice O'Connor observed in her Blakely dissent, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Washington State sentencing system
were indistinguishable in all constitutionally relevant respects. 10
Both systems attempted to achieve uniformity and proportionality in
sentencing by blending charge-based and real-conduct-based
considerations.' The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt (or
146. 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004).
147. Id. at 2534.
148. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
149. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).
150. Id. at 2544-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
151. See United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 749 (2005) (majority opinion of
Stevens, J.). Using the Hobbs Act as an example, Justice Breyer illustrated the vast range
of conduct that a single criminal statute can encompass. The Hobbs Act prohibits
extortion that affects commerce or "the movement of any article or commodity in
commerce." Id. at 760 (majority opinion of Breyer, J) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)
(2000)). As Justice Breyer explains, it would cover a person who "threatens to injure a co-
worker unless the co-worker advances him a few dollars from the interstate company's
till," as well as a person who makes a similar demand but "causes far more harm by
seeking far more money, by making certain that the co-worker's family is aware of the
threat, [and] by arranging for deliveries of dead animals to the co-worker's home to show
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more often, the defendant admitted in a plea agreement) the facts
necessary to convict the defendant of the crime with which he was
charged, but the sentencing judge tailored the defendant's sentence to
his actual conduct by finding additional facts that could often enhance
the defendant's sentence beyond that which the jury's verdict (or the
defendant's admissions) alone would support.152 It was in this latter
aspect, the sentencing enhancement based upon judicial factfinding,
that the Court found constitutional infirmity.
Thus, it was no surprise when the same, oddly-formed coalition
of justices that had decided Apprendi and Blakely invalidated the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Booker.153 The Court brushed aside
the government's formalistic arguments distinguishing the sentencing
scheme at issue in Blakely and the Federal Guidelines on the grounds
that the Blakely scheme was legislatively enacted and the Guidelines
were an administrative creation. 54 It was not the source of the
Guidelines system that was constitutionally significant, but rather the
fact that its "sentencing rules [were] mandatory and impose[d]
binding requirements on all sentencing judges."'55 The Court further
explained that, were the Guidelines merely advisory, they would raise
no constitutional problem, for the Court had "never doubted the
authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a
sentence within a statutory range." '156
he is serious." Id. at 760 (majority opinion of Breyer, J.). The latter person clearly
deserves greater punishment than the former but the statute treats them the same. Only
by taking into account the offender' actual conduct will he be sentenced according to the
harm he has caused.
152. The facts in defendant Booker's case provide a clear example of the distinction.
The jury, after hearing evidence that Booker possessed 92.5 grams of cocaine, found him
guilty under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) of possession with intent to distribute at least fifty
grams of crack cocaine. Id. at 746 (majority opinion of Stevens, J.). Based solely on the
facts found by the jury, § 841(a)(1) permitted a maximum sentence of life imprisonment,
the relevant Guidelines provisions permitted a maximum sentence of only 262 months
imprisonment. Id. (majority opinion of Stevens, J.). In a post-trial sentencing proceeding,
however, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker had actually
possessed an additional 566 grams of cocaine. Id. (majority opinion of Stevens, J.). Based
on these additional facts, the Guidelines required the judge to sentence Booker to a prison
term between 360 months and life. Booker received a 360 month sentence, far more
severe than the 262 months in prison he could have received based solely on the facts
found by the jury. Id. (majority opinion of Stevens, J.).
153. See id. at 746, (majority opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Scalia, Souter, Thomas,
and Ginsburg, JJ.); Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2534 (opinion of Scalia, J., joined by Stevens,
Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ.); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468 (opinion of Stevens, J.,
joined by Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ.).
154. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 752-53 (majority opinion of Stevens, J.).
155. Id. at 749-50 (majority opinion of Stevens, J.).
156. Id. at 750 (majority opinion of Stevens, J.).
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2. The Remedial Decision
In what has probably been correctly perceived as an attempt to
rescue as much of the SRA and Guidelines from the Court's
constitutional ruling as possible, 57 the remedial majority (whose only
common denominator with the constitutional majority was Justice
Ginsburg), severed only those provisions of the SRA that made the
Guidelines binding upon sentencing judges.'58 The Court excised 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which commanded sentencing judges to sentence
within the Guidelines range unless a departure was warranted, thus
rendering the Guidelines advisory.'59 The Court also severed the
section, newly enacted by the Feeney Amendment and briefly
discussed above, 16° that provided for de novo review of sentencing
decisions because it found the section depended too heavily on the
Guidelines' mandatory nature. 161 All other provisions of the SRA,
including those recently added by the Feeney Amendment, remain in
force. 62
Significantly, the Court left untouched § 3553(a) which requires
sentencing courts to take the Guidelines into account. Thus, while
sentencing judges are not bound by the Guidelines, they violate
§ 3553(a) if they do not consider the Guidelines when determining a
157. See Douglas A. Berman, The Revenge of Breyer?, Sentencing Law and Policy Blog
(Jan. 13, 2005), http://sentencing.typepad.comlsentencing-law-and-policy/2005/week2/
index.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Because Justice Breyer played
a key role in the passage of the SRA as chief counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee
and later served on the Commission, some observers suggested that he should have
recused himself from participating in Booker. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court
Transforms Use of Sentencing Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at Al (noting
Breyer's involvement in the SRA and Guidelines); Tony Mauro, Supreme Court:
Sentencing Guidelines Advisory, Not Mandatory, LEGAL TIMES, online ed., at
http://www.law.com (Jan. 13, 2005) (reporting that some judicial ethics experts suggested
that Breyer should have recused himself) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
158. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 756 (majority opinion of Breyer, J.). The majority justified its
remedial decision on the grounds that, among the available alternatives, the majority's
approach conformed most closely to Congress's probable intent in light of the Court's
constitutional conclusion. See id. at 757. (majority opinion of Breyer, J.).
159. Id. (majority opinion of Breyer, J.). The remedy is indeed puzzling in light of the
Court's constitutional holding. The Guidelines were constitutionally deficient because
they vested too much power in the sentencing judge at the expense of the jury, yet the
Court remedied that deficiency by vesting in the judiciary more sentencing discretion than
it had enjoyed under the unconstitutional system.
160. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
161. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 765 (majority opinion of Breyer, J.) (severing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(e)).
162. Id. at 764 (majority opinion of Breyer, J.). Furthermore, "the Sentencing
Commission remains in place, writing Guidelines, collecting information about actual
district court sentencing decisions, undertaking research and revising the Guidelines
accordingly." Id. at 767 (majority opinion of Breyer, J.).
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sentence. 163  Furthermore, while the Court severed the section
providing for de novo appellate review of sentencing decisions, it
found implicit in the SRA a "reasonableness" standard of review.
164
In so holding, the Court effectively reinstated the pre-Feeney
Amendment status quo.65
B. The Effect of Booker on the Feeney Amendment
At first glance, the Booker decision seems to vest in the judiciary
more sentencing discretion than it has enjoyed in decades.166 After
all, the Guidelines no longer bind sentencing judges, and appellate
courts, while still authorized to review sentencing decisions, are
instructed to adopt a more deferential posture in doing so. The
Booker decision doubtless shifts the balance of power, fundamentally
tilted by the Feeney Amendment, back towards the district courts.
Many federal district judges who felt that the Guidelines forced them
to impose unjust sentences have warmly welcomed the Booker
decision, claiming that it gives them the power to tailor the sentence
to the individual case before them in such a way as the Guidelines,
especially as modified by the Feeney Amendment, precluded them
from doing.'67
163. Id. at 764 (majority opinion of Breyer, J.) ("Without the 'mandatory' provision,
the Act nonetheless requires judges to take account of the Guidelines together with other
sentencing goals.").
164. Id. at 765 (majority opinion of Breyer, J.).
165. Id. ("Until 2003, § 3742(e) explicitly set forth [the reasonableness] standard.").
166. See, e.g., Natasha Korecki & Abdon Pallasch, Court Gives Judges Last Word on
Sentences, CHI. SUN-TIMES, online ed. (Jan. 13, 2005), at http://www.suntimes.com (last
visited Jan. 25, 2005) (reporting that "[s]ome experts say judges now have more power
than ever to impose sentences") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Mauro,
supra note 157 (quoting Professor Frank Bowman III as saying, "You can argue that, after
[Booker], judges have the greatest sentencing power they've ever had in the history of the
republic."); David G. Savage, Judges Freed from Sentencing Rules, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13,
2005, at Al (declaring Booker a "victory for the judiciary and a setback for lawmakers
who would like to limit judges' sentencing authority").
167. See, e.g., Alicia Caldwell, Justices: "Mandatory Guidelines" Unconstitutional,
DENVER POST, Jan. 13, 2005, at Al (quoting U.S. District Judge John Kane: "I think it's a
very positive thing because it puts the decisionmaking responsibility on the person who is
supposed to be making the decision, and that is the judge."); Stephanie Hanes, High Court
Upsets Rule on Sentencing, BALT. SUN, Jan. 13, 2005, at Al (quoting U.S. District Court
Judge Catherine C. Blake as stating that "[ilt appears ... that the Supreme Court has left
in place a system that will truly guide a judge's discretion at sentencing without mandating
what might in an individual case be an unjust result"); Carl Hulse & Adam Liptak, New
Fight Over Controlling Punishments is Widely Seen, NY. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A27,
(quoting U.S. District Judge Jack B. Weinstein: "It gives us the discretion to deal with
individual cases without being unnecessarily harsh. This is now, if Congress leaves it, a
marvelous system."); Shelley Murphy, 2 Boston Jurists Hail Return of Discretion, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 13, 2005, at A20 (noting that U.S. District Court Judge Nancy Gertner
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To the extent that Booker does give trial judges more discretion
in sentencing, it alleviates many of the concerns discussed above that
were exacerbated by the Feeney Amendment, including the failure of
the Guidelines system to take full advantage of the trial bench's
experience with the actual human actors involved in the sentencing
drama. Yet, just how much discretion sentencing judges enjoy
remains to be seen.168 Certain aspects of the Booker opinion, the
provisions of the Feeney Amendment that survived constitutional
attack, and district judges' undoubted awareness that Congress will be
watching them very closely (using many of the tools provided by the
Feeney Amendment) suggest that district judges may not enjoy as
much discretion as it initially appears.
As mentioned above, the Court's remedial decision makes the
Guidelines advisory by eliminating 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) which
commanded trial judges to impose a sentence within the applicable
Guidelines range unless a departure was permitted. The decision left
in place, however, § 3553(a), which requires sentencing judges to
consider, among other factors, the applicable Guidelines range.
Booker also spared § 3553(c)(2), the recent addition from the Feeney
Amendment that requires sentencing judges to provide specific,
written reasons whenever they depart from the applicable Guidelines
range. Read together, these provisions indicate that a sentencing
judge must still provide good reasons for departing from the
Guidelines range, despite the fact that the Guidelines are now only
advisory. Also significant is the fact that Booker retained appellate
review of sentencing decisions, albeit in diluted form.169 If a district
judge departs from the Guidelines range and the government appeals,
the appellate court will still receive the district court's statement of
reasons justifying the departure. If the court of appeals decides that
the departure from the Guidelines range is "unreasonable," it wili
reverse. If the district judge decides to ignore the "advisory"
understood Booker to permit judicial consideration of individual offender characteristics);
Weinstein & Rosenzweig, supra note 86, (reporting that U.S. District Court Judge Dickran
Tevrizian said Booker "gives judges the discretion to sentence the individual and not just
the crime"); Deborah Yetter, Mandatory Sentencing Rules Eased, COURIER-J. (Ky.), Jan.
13, 2005, at Al (quoting U.S. District Judge Edward H. Johnstone: "I think it restores to
the trial judge some of the discretion the guidelines took away.").
168. As Professor Douglas Berman observed, "the only certainty about the future of
federal sentencing after Booker is uncertainty." Douglas A. Berman, Take a Deep Breath,
Sentencing Law and Policy Blog (Jan. 13, 2005), http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing-lawand-policy/2005/week2/index.html (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
169. See Booker, at 765 (majority opinion of Breyer, J.) (finding an implied
"reasonableness" standard of review).
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Guidelines altogether, the court of appeals will surely reverse.
Though the "reasonableness" standard of review was interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Koon v. United Statesa17 to permit reversal only
upon a finding that the district court abused its discretion, 71 courts of
appeals often evaluated downward departures very strictly under that
standard. 72
Furthermore, the various "exposure" provisions of the Feeney
Amendment remain in force. Not only must each sentencing judge
provide a written statement of reasons whenever she departs from the
applicable Guidelines range, but the chief judge of each district is still
required to ensure that the Commission receives a detailed report of
each sentence, including the reasons for any departure.1 73  This
information is still available to the Attorney General and the House
and Senate Committees on the Judiciary.174 A recent letter from the
Sentencing Commission to all district judges confirmed that both the
statement of reasons for departure and the sentencing report are still
required after Booker.175 These requirements ensure that sentencing
judges are aware that Congress is watching what they do and the
reasons for which they do it. 176  Those judges who welcome the
sentencing discretion bestowed upon them by Booker may wish to
walk softly for fear of quick and drastic congressional action. And by
all accounts, Congress is likely to start thinking about sentencing
again soon.
177
170. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
171. Id. at 98-99.
172. Although the government certainly does not appeal every downward departure, it
is telling that in fiscal year 2001, the federal appellate courts affirmed only twenty percent
of those appealed. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 63, at table 58.
173. See PROTECT Act, § 401(h), 117 Stat. 650, 672 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)
(2000)).
174. See § 401(h)(2), (4).
175. See Douglas A. Berman, Always Remember to Show Your Work, Sentencing Law
and Policy Blog (Jan. 21, 2005) (discussing a letter from Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair of
United States Sentencing Commission, to all federal district judges),
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-and-policy/2005/01/always-remember.html (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
176. As District Judge Ruben Castillo aptly observed, "I think Congress will be looking
for any judges who will be doing anything unusual." Korecki & Pallasch, supra note 166.
177. Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court expressly indicated that Congress has the
next move. United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 768 (2005) (majority opinion of
Breyer, J.) ("Ours, of course, is not the last word: The ball now lies in Congress's court.");
see also Jerry Bier, Ruling May Impact Porn Case, FRESNO BEE, Jan. 15, 2005, at
http://www.fresnobee.com/local/story/9773986p-10637228c.html (quoting District Judge
Oliver W. Wanger: "We know we are going to get a response from Congress, and I
suspect we're going to get it sooner than later.") (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); Hulse & Liptak, supra note 167 (reporting that "lawmakers in both parties said
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Yet, unlike § 3553(b)(1), which mandated compliance with only
the Guidelines themselves, the new governing provision § 3553(a)
directs sentencing judges to consider, in addition to the applicable
Guidelines range, a variety of factors including: the need for the
sentence to reflect the purposes of punishment (deterrence,
retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated
defendants, the need to provide restitution to the victim, and perhaps
most welcome of all to many federal district judges, "the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant."'78 Furthermore, the so-called "parsimony provision" of
§ 3553(a) directs judges to impose a sentence "sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes" set forth
above. 79  Two remarkably thoughtful post-Booker sentencing
decisions reflect the widely divergent manners in which sentencing
judges may respond to the ascendancy of § 3553(a) as the principal
sentencing guidepost.
Just one day after Booker was decided, District Judge Paul G.
Cassell issued an opinion concluding that sentencing courts should
continue to give the Guidelines "considerable weight" when
determining what sentence to impose, because the Guidelines
themselves most accurately reflect the purposes sent forth in
§ 3553(a). 18° Judge Cassell placed a great deal of emphasis on
congressional intent.181 In regards to the purposes of punishment set
forth in § 3553(a)(1), Judge Cassell concluded that "Congress'
creation of the Commission and subsequent approval of the
Commission's Guidelines provides strong reason for believing that
Guidelines sentences satisfy the congressionally-mandated purposes
they expected that hearings on sentencing guidelines would be quickly covered").
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2), (6) & (7) (2000).
179. See id. § 3553(a). Professors Miller and Wright, two highly regarded sentencing
scholars, have argued that the parsimony provision indicates that Congress intended
sentencing judges to have "substantial power" to sentence outside the Guidelines range.
Marc. L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin' Heart(land): The Long Search for
Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 723, 746-47 (1999) (cited in
United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005)).
180. See United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005). It is worth
noting at the outset that Judge Cassell has been one of the Guidelines' most forceful
advocates on the federal trial bench. See generally Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A
Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of Federal Mandatory
Minimums), 56 STAN L. REV. 1017 (2004) (supporting the Guidelines and attacking
criticisms that they are too severe).
181. This is probably a wise approach, given that Congress will have the last word on
sentencing, and as discussed in more detail below, will probably act sooner than later. See
supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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of punishment."' 82 Furthermore, Judge Cassell reasoned, Congress
"reconfirmed that its expectations that courts follow the Guidelines in
the recently-adopted 'Feeney Amendment,' " which "was meant to
'put strict limitations on departures .... 183 He also noted that
§ 3553(a)(6) requires consideration of the need to reduce sentencing
disparities among similarly situated defendants. The only way to
assure uniformity on a national scale among hundreds of district
judges, he reasoned, is to comply with the only national standard
available: the Guidelines."8 Judge Cassell also discounted the
potentially mitigating effects of the parsimony provision. He
repeated that congressional approval of the Guidelines suggests the
Guidelines' sentences are "sufficient" to attain the purposes of
§ 3553(a), and also noted that the parsimony provision binds, not only
the courts, but the Commission as well. 85 In language largely echoing
the Guidelines' language concerning departures, Judge Cassell
concluded that he would impose sentences outside the Guidelines
range only in "unusual" and "exceptional" cases.186
Judge Cassell's reliance on the Feeney Amendment is evidence
that Congress intends judges to comply with the Guidelines and
merits attention. It suggests, not only an understanding that Congress
is likely to respond to Booker, but that the Feeney Amendment, as
Congress's most recent pronouncement on sentencing, likely
resembles the approach that Congress will take in the near future.
Perhaps most notably absent from Judge Cassell's opinion is any
substantial discussion of § 3553(a)(1), which requires sentencing
judges to consider the history and personal characteristics of the
defendants they sentence. Given Judge Cassell's affinity for the
Guidelines, this omission should not be surprising since the
Guidelines generally preclude departures based on such personal
characteristics as age, education, mental or emotional condition, drug
dependence, family ties, socio-economic status, or lack of guidance as
a child.187
In United States v. Ranum,188 District Judge Lynn Adelman took
a decidedly different approach, arguing that Judge Cassell's opinion
182. See Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 915.
183. Id. at 915-16 (quoting 149 CONG. REC. H3061 (Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Feeney)).
184. Id. at 924.
185. Id. at 923 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1) (2000)).
186. Id. at 912, 925.
187. See 2003 U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 5H1.1-1.12.
188. No. 04-CR-31 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 18,2005).
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was inconsistent with Booker.189 Her reasoning centered upon the
inconsistencies between the Guidelines and § 3553(a), especially in
their treatment of the personal characteristics of individual
defendants discussed above. In her view, a sentencing court that
neglects to consider the personal characteristics of the defendant,
though in compliance with the Guidelines, fails to fulfill its statutory
mandate. 190 The Guidelines are merely advisory, but compliance with
§ 3553(a) is required. Judge Adelman further noted that
§ 3553(a)(2)(D), which requires sentencing judges "to evaluate the
need to provide the defendant with education, training, treatment or
medical care in the most effective manner," is often in conflict with
the Guidelines' prescription of prison in most cases. She also
approached the parsimony provision quite differently than Judge
Cassell, citing Justice Kennedy's recent public condemnation of the
harshness of the federal sentencing system. 9'
Needless to say, neither of these opinions is authoritative. Some
district courts have followed Judge Cassell's reasoning,1" others have
followed Judge Adelman's lead and placed more emphasis on the
personal characteristics of individual defendants,'93 and others will
189. Id. slip op. at 2.
190. Id. slip op. at 4. In his majority opinion in Booker, Justice Breyer conspicuously
failed to make any mention of § 3553(a)(1)'s requirement that sentencing judges consider
the personal characteristics of the defendant. Yet he did draw attention to a related
provision, § 3661, that survived Booker. See United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 760
(2005) (majority opinion of Breyer, J.). Although he drew support from § 3661 for his
conclusion that Congress intended the survival of a sentencing system that considered the
defendant's real conduct, the statute also mandates consideration of the defendant's
background and character. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000) ("No limitation shall be placed on
the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted
of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose
of imposing an appropriate sentence.").
191. See Ranum, slip op. at 4 n.1. The full text of Justice Kennedy's widely publicized
speech can be found on the United States Supreme Court's official website:
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp08-09-03.html (last visited Mar. 1,
2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
192. See Douglas A. Berman, Anecdotes, Data, and the USSC's Big Challenge,
Sentencing Law and Policy Blog, Jan. 20, 2005 (noting that some district judges have
followed Judge Cassell's approach), http://sentencing.typepad.comsentencinglaw-
and-policy/2005/week3/index.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also
Hulse & Liptak, supra note 167 (quoting Chief Judge William G. Young: "I personally
will try to be completely faithful to [Booker], which means I will consider the advice of the
guidelines and consider it seriously.").
193. See Dan Herbeck, Thanks to High Court, Drug Defendant Gets 2nd Chance,
BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 20, 2005, at B1 (2005 WL 62858039) (describing a case in which the
Guidelines sentence was two years, but the judge sentenced the defendant to three years
supervised release in part because the defendant had quit using drugs, had a full-time job,
and was attending community college); Ken Kobayashi, Hawaii Defendant's Sentence
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doubtless develop additional approaches. Moreover, only time will
tell how much deviation from the Guidelines appellate courts will
consider "reasonable," and, as mentioned above, it is probably only a
matter of time before Congress steps back into the debate. Until
then, however, district judges should take advantage of the
unprecedented opportunity to contribute to the development of
sentencing policy presented by the newly established authority of
§ 3553(a) and the Feeney Amendment's "written reasons"
requirement. The next Part addresses this development.
IV. A NEW ROLE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS
Commentators have criticized trial courts for failing to assert
themselves in the role set out for them by the SRA.194 Trial judges
were to give input for the evolution of the Guidelines by providing
reasons for departures that would help the Commission fine-tune the
Guidelines and allow the appellate courts to develop a common law
of sentencing. 195 The idea was that the Commission had much to
learn from the experience of the federal judiciary. Requiring a
statement of reasons by the trial judge would have all of the
advantages that the common law system brings to bear on the law in
general. Statements of reasons would permit the creation of an
accumulated and visible body of law that the Commission and federal
judges could follow, criticize, and build upon.196
The early sentencing reformers, including Senator Kennedy,
believed that trial judges should be required to abide by the
Reduced, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Jan. 19, 2005 (2005 WL 60802697) (noting that
District Judge David Ezra reduced a defendant's sentence below the Guidelines sentence
because the defendant was devoted to his family, was a successful and trustworthy
businessman, and had undergone excessive treatment).
194. See Berman, supra note 6, at 99 ("Federal judges have not seized their
opportunities to develop a meaningful common law of sentencing and thus have not
effectively fulfilled their role as sentencing lawmakers with the SRA scheme."); Marc
Miller & Daniel J. Freed, Honoring Judicial Discretion Under the Sentencing Reform Act,
3 FED. SENT. R. 235,235 (1991) (noting that the judiciary wears "self-imposed handcuffs").
195. 2003 U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 1AI.1 cmt. Editorial Note 4(b). Professor von
Hirsch argues that the development of a common law of sentencing would be ineffective
to improve the Guidelines. He believes that, because Guidelines are flawed at a structural
level, they cannot be cured by simple amendments. See von Hirsch, supra note 69, at 380-
81. Furthermore, he contends that the absence of an underlying rationale in the
Guidelines precludes the development of a coherent body of law. See id. at 381-82.
Professor von Hirsch may be correct in these observations, but the Guidelines seem to be
here to stay. Absent conclusive proof of his points it seems that the judiciary should do
what to can with the tools available to it.
196. Miller, supra note 5, at 16.
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Guidelines or provide written justifications for departure, 97 but the
SRA only required judges to state their reasons for departure in open
court.198 Thus, it is no surprise that trial judges generally have failed
to write thoughtful sentencing opinions.199 The statement of reasons
in open court is only available to those who hear the statement and
those with access to the transcript; thus, appellate courts have access
to the statement if the case is appealed, but the public, the
Commission, and other trial judges do not °.2  The statement in open
court is also likely to be incomplete because the trial judge is unlikely
to comprehensively state the facts that would give other judges a
sense of her reasoning and its applicability to other cases.20 1 A trial
judge is probably unlikely to take the time to write sentencing
opinions when there is neither a body of law upon which to build nor
a general audience for the opinion.
The Feeney Amendment's requirement that sentencing judges
provide written reasons for each departure from the Guidelines
answers these concerns and is actually more in tune with the original
intentions of the sentencing reformers than was the SRA.2°2 Though
it may appear a burden in some cases, sentencing judges should take
advantage of the opportunity, especially now that Booker has opened
the door to considerations beyond the Guidelines themselves by
establishing § 3553(a) as the statute that guides sentencing decisions.
As mentioned above, § 3553(a) requires sentencing judges to consider
the applicable Guidelines range but also requires them to account for
the personal characteristics of the defendant before them and the
degree to which the sentence will further the various purposes of
punishment. District judges across the nation who felt constrained by
what they felt were unjustly severe Guidelines welcome the freedom
197. See Kennedy, supra note 54, at 271.
198. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2000).
199. Berman, supra note 6, at 106 (noting that the failure of judges to write thoughtful
sentencing opinions has been especially detrimental to the development of a common law
of sentencing).
200. Sweet, et al., supra note 39, at 940 (noting that "transcripts of sentencing
statements are generally unavailable both to the public and sentencing judges").
201. Id.
202. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401(c), 117 Stat. 650, 669-70 (2003). The
extent to which the Feeney Amendment fulfills the desires of the original sentencing
reformers should not be over-exaggerated. This is perhaps the one provision with which
they would agree. As discussed above, Senator Kennedy, the primary congressional
proponent of the SRA, has recently introduced a bill that would essentially repeal the
Feeney Amendment in the PROTECT Act. See JUDGES Act, S. 1086, 108th Cong.
(2003); 149 CONG. REC. S6711 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
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that Booker brings, 03 but many understand that their freedom may be
short-lived depending on how quickly Congress acts.2 4 As Judge
Cassell observed in United States v. Wilson, Congress has consistently
approved of the Guidelines, 2°5 so a sentencing judge certainly faces an
uphill battle in convincing Congress in a particular case that departing
from the Guidelines range is the just result despite the fact that strict
adherence to the Guidelines would preclude a departure. This only
suggests, however, that sentencing judges should choose their battles
wisely and engage thoughtfully with the factors § 3553(a) requires
them to consider. 6
Take Judge Adelman's application of § 3553(a) in United States
v. Ranum2°7 as an example. The defendant Ranum, a loan officer
employed by State Financial Bank, had made loans larger than he was
authorized to grant to a startup cruise company.2 8 When the
company began to falter, the defendant loaned it even more money.20 9
Although he believed and told his superiors that the second loan was
"cash collateralized" and thus "risk free," it turned out that he was
wrong.210 The company eventually went under and the bank's total
loss amounted to over $1 million.211 The defendant was convicted of
two counts of misapplication of bank funds and one count of making
a false statement in connection with a loan application. 12
Judge Adelman began by calculating the Guidelines sentence,
and concluded that the Guidelines suggested imprisonment for thirty-
seven to forty-six months.213 She then observed that, though the
defendant had clearly been "abusing his employer's trust," been
dishonest with his employer, and acted recklessly with his employer's
money, the defendant had not acted for personal pecuniary gain or
for improper personal gain of another.214 Although he made poor
203. See supra note 167.
204. See supra note 177.
205. See United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 915 (D. Utah 2005).
206. Although district judges may have been deterred in the past from taking the time
to write sentencing opinions by the rate at which appellate courts have reversed downward
departures from the Guidelines, they should be invigorated by the new "reasonableness"
standard of review and the Guidelines' "advisory" nature. See United States v. Booker,
125 S.Ct. 738, 764-65 (2005).
207. 04-CR-31, slip op. at 6 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 19, 2005).
208. Id. slip op. at 7.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. slip op. at 8.
212. Id. slip op. at 8-9.
213. Id. slip op. at 9-10.
214. Id. slip op. at 10.
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decisions, his actions demonstrated that he made serious attempts to
protect the bank. The Guidelines, however, failed to take the
defendant's motives into account. By "mechanical[ly]" correlating
pecuniary loss with the offense level, "the guidelines treat a person
who steals $100,000 to finance a lavish lifestyle the same as someone
who steals the same amount to pay for an operation for a sick
child." '215 Thus, the Guidelines, by unduly stressing the harm done,
fail to account for the defendant's actual culpability.
She then turned to personal characteristics of the defendant. She
noted, among other things, that the defendant had done an
"excellent" job raising two daughters as a single parent, had a solid
employment history, and provided care and support for his aging
parents, one of whom suffered from Alzheimer's disease and the
other of whom suffered from depression.216  Judge Aldeman
concluded that imprisoning the defendant for the term suggested by
the Guidelines "would have a profoundly adverse impact on both his
children and his parents."" 7  The defendant had asked to be
sentenced to some period of home confinement, but, "in order to
promote respect for the law and in recognition of the significant loss
to the bank," Judge Aldeman sentenced the defendant to a year and a
day in prison. 18
The care with which Judge Aldeman weighed the various
§ 3553(a) factors should serve as a model for the sentencing judge
seeking to exercise the discretion Booker grants in a way that should
command the respect (if not the approval) of even the toughest
"crime control" advocate in Congress or on the appellate bench. She
gave significant weight to the Guidelines sentence, calculating it
openly, and imposing a sentence that reflected in part the Guideline's
heavy emphasis on the harm done to the victim. But she also
considered other factors, including the motive and culpability of the
defendant, which speaks largely to the "just punishment for the
offense" and the need "to protect the public from further crimes of
the defendant." '219 Finally, she placed some emphasis on "the nature
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
the defendant."22 This multi-factored approach is not only consistent
with § 3553(a), but appraises the Commission and Congress of the
215. Id. slip op. at 11.
216. Id. slip op. at 12.
217. Id.
218. Id. slip op. at 13.
219. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) & (D) (2000).
220. Id. § 3553(a)(1).
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considerations she found relevant but lacking in the Guidelines.
Although Judge Aldeman cannot ensure that the Commission and
Congress will listen, she is fulfilling the role envisioned for her by the
early sentencing reformers.221
V. RECOMMENDATIONS To CONGRESS
Just over a year ago, Congress enacted a statute sternly rebuking
the district courts, and making the Guidelines "even more mandatory
than they had been." '222 Booker made the Guidelines advisory and
returned to the district courts even more discretion than the Feeney
Amendment took away. A congressional response is certain. This
Part argues that Congress should take time to study and analyze the
effects that the recent increase in judicial discretion in sentencing has
on the administration of justice in the federal system.
As discussed above, though the increase in the rate of downward
departures may present serious problems to the fair administration of
justice, the rate of downward departures may be a result of other
forces, including the rapid increase in "fast track" dispositions and
increased governmental support of departures in certain cases.2 3
Congress simply did not take the time to address these important
issues when it proposed the Feeney Amendment. The House of
Representatives tacked the Feeney Amendment onto the PROTECT
Act less than a month before it was passed into law. 24  The
congressional review consisted of a hearing at the subcommittee level
in the House of Representatives on a portion of the Amendment and
limited debate on the House and Senate floor.2" Neither the federal
221. Some district judges may respond that calculating the sentencing range according
to the overly complex Guidelines (which, of course, Booker and § 3553(a) explicitly
require) leaves them without time to write sentencing opinions. Berman, supra note 6, at
102 (noting that the "sheer bulk of sentencing law created by the Commission... leave[s]
judges with relatively less time and fewer opportunities to engage in the meaningful
common-law dialogue about sentencing that is essential if they are to contribute
effectively to the evolution of the guideline system"). Moreover, the Feeney
Amendment's new reporting requirements place a heavier burden on judges' time than
existed before. PROTECT Act, § 401(h), 117 Stat. at 672. These contentions
underestimate the creativity and resourcefulness of federal judges. One chief district court
judge has already successfully passed off his reporting requirements to the U.S. Attorney's
office, noting that the statute only requires that the chief judge "ensure that" the reporting
is accomplished completely and punctually. See United States v. Ray, 273 F. Supp. 2d
1160,1165 (D. Mont. 2003), affd, 375 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2004).
222. United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 765 (2005) (majority opinion of Breyer, J.).
223. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
224. See S. 151 EAH, 108th Cong. § 109 (2003).
225. See Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Secretary, U.S. Sentencing
Commission, to Orrin G. Hatch, Senator (Apr. 3, 2003), reprinted in 149 CONG. REC.
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judiciary, the Sentencing Commission, nor the organized bar were
given a meaningful opportunity to consider the proposal.26 Senator
Leahy and Representative Waters suggested that the Amendment
was attached to the PROTECT Act because the Act had almost
universal support in Congress and because even those who opposed
the amendment would not likely want to be perceived as voting
against a bill concerning the abduction of children.
227
It was to avoid these kinds of hasty judgments and political
maneuvers that the SRA vested sentencing authority in the
independent U.S. Sentencing Commission.228  As an independent
agency designed for the sole purpose of creating and refining a fair
sentencing system, the Commission is institutionally more capable
than Congress of addressing complex sentencing issues such as the
causes of the increase in the rate of downward departures. Rather
than rushing to judgment and blaming the judiciary for the rising
departure rate, the better course would have been to direct the
Sentencing Commission to study the issue and report to Congress on
what it deems the proper solution to the problem.
Perhaps Congress should use as a model the Judicial Use of
Discretion to Guarantee Equity on Sentencing (JUDGES) Act-a
bill proposed by Senator Kennedy in response to the Feeney
Amendment. 229 The bill would have repealed those provisions of the
Feeney Amendment that Booker left in force. 23 ° The bill also would
have required the Commission to compile a report within 180 days
that includes, among other things: information on rates of departures
in various districts, an analysis of the grounds upon which district
judges depart from the Guidelines, an assessment of the extent to
which departures promote or circumvent the Guidelines system, an
assessment of the extent to which various departures further the
ultimate goals of punishment, and an assessment of the extent to
which appellate review of departures is sufficient to further the goals
of the Guidelines system. 3' In compiling its report, the Commission
would have been required to hold at least one public hearing at which
$5120-S5121 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
226. See Letter from American Bar Association to Rep. Scott, (Apr. 9, 2003), reprinted
in 149 CONG. REC. H3067 (statement of Rep. Scott).
227. See 149 CONG. REC. S5130 (statement of Sen. Leahy); H3071 (statement of Rep.
Scott).
228. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
229. S. 1086, 108th Cong. (2003).
230. Id. § 3(a). The bill would repeal most of the major provisions of the Feeney
Amendment but would leave the rest of the PROTECT Act unaffected.
231. Id. § 2(b).
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all interested parties, including the Department of Justice and the
federal judiciary, could inform the Commission of their views.232
A cautious approach that gives the Commission time to gather
information from all interested groups for analysis is perhaps even
more appropriate in the aftermath of the Booker decision. 33 Because
of the novelty of the system Booker created, Congress should take
time to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses. Though Congress may
very well decide to enact a different system, it may wish to retain
elements of the Booker system. The only way to know would be to
take time to observe and study how sentencing practices unfold.
CONCLUSION
Although the precise amount of discretion that sentencing judges
enjoy after Booker is difficult to determine in light of the sentencing
law still in force, there is no question that Booker has, at least
temporarily, helped to restore to the district courts some of the power
the SRA intended them to wield. Congress is sure to respond, and
may respond quickly. District judges should use the time they have
and the tools provided by Booker and the Feeney Amendment to
make their voices heard and hopefully convince Congress that some
232. Id. §2(c). Senator Hatch maintains that the Commission has been aware of
Congress's concern over the rising departure rate since 2000 and that the Commission's
failure to reach any conclusions demonstrates that departures are "simply not a priority to
the Sentencing Commission." 149 CONG. REC. S5123 (statement of Sen. Hatch). Senator
Kennedy pointed out, however, that, at the time of the passage of the PROTECT Act, the
Commission was undertaking an extensive study of departures and simply needed more
time to reach any definitive conclusions. See Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham,
Secretary, U.S. Sentencing Commission, to Orrin G. Hatch, Senator (Apr. 3, 2003),
reprinted in 149 CONG. REC. S5120-S5121 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
233. Many Congresspersons, scholars, and judges have already urged Congress to
approach sentencing reform slowly. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Why Congress Should
Go Slow, and What the USSC Should Say, Sentencing Law and Policy Blog, Jan. 16, 2005
(urging Congress to move cautiously), http://sentencing.typad.com/sentencing-law
and-policy/2005/week2/index.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Hanes, supra note 167 (quoting Magistrate Judge James K.
Bredar: "I hope Congress will not act precipitously in an effort to curtail judicial
discretion and instead will direct the U.S. Sentencing Commission to monitor and report
on judges' sentencing decisions over the next year or two"); Mauro, supra note 157
(quoting Senator Patrick Leahy: "Congress should resist the urge to rush in with quick
fixes that would only generate more uncertainty and litigation and do nothing to protect
public safety."); Torsten Ove, Jurists Here Reacting Favorably, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETrE, Jan. 13, 2005, online ed., at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05013/441447.stm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005) (quoting District Judge Robert Cindrich: "I can only hope that
the Congress will take a serious look at the sentencing laws as the court has suggested and
that the future sentencing laws will be more of reason and sensibility than has been
demonstrated in the past.") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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amount of judicial discretion in sentencing is necessary if the system is
to be fair to criminal defendants on an individualized basis.
0. DEAN SANDERFORD
